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We hereby propose a model to analyze the provision of environmental protection activities (United 
Nation 2005) with positive interregional externalities in order to verify - at least in theory - whether 
this  kind  of  policy  is  better  accomplished  through  centralized  policymaking,  which  implies  a 
coordinated  solution  among  local  representatives,  or  a  decentralized  system,  whereby  local 
authorities independently finance and implement their environmental protection policy. The research 
question  concerns  the  identification  of  criteria  on  how  to  allocate  powers  and  functions  to 
environmental  management  at  different  tiers  of  government.  Moreover,  modelling  interregional 
externalities as a mechanism contributing to lowering the cost of financing environmental policy in 
each region (production externality), we can assume that different environmental policies are allowed 
across regions. Given this general framework, considerations favouring either institutional setting in 
terms of individuals’ welfare seem to involve interaction among these key elements: the extent of the 
inter-jurisdictional  spillovers,  the  size  of  local  jurisdictions  and  the  regional  preferences  for 
environmental protection policy.  
 
 
JEL classification: H71, H73, H23, Q58 
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A part of the literature on fiscal federalism over the years has dealt with environmental policy as a 
specific case of the supply of public goods. In particular, according to the literature on environmental 
federalism (Kraft and Scheberle 1998; Oates and Portney 2001; Oates 2002; Kunce and Shogren 
2005; Dalmazzone 2006; Breton et al. 2007), an important role for decentralized governments in the 
setting of environmental standards and the design of regulatory programs can be properly played 
under  certain  circumstances.  Indeed,  for  environmental  problems  that  are  highly  localized, 
economics suggests that it makes more sense to set standards for environmental quality that reflect 
local conditions rather than uniform national standards (Schwab 2006).  
More generally, environmental policymaking typically takes place in the context of a system 
with several levels of government. This raises the important issue of the appropriate role of the 
various governments in the setting of environmental standards, the design of regulatory measures to 
attain  the  standards  and  the  monitoring  and  enforcement  of  these  measures.  Indeed,  it  is 
commonplace for environmental measures to take the form of centrally determined standards, with 
the responsibility for implementation lying in the hands of state or provincial governments.  
Thus, environmental policy is often a joint activity in which the exact division of responsibilities 
varies substantially among countries. In the European Union, for example, there is a continuing 
conflict between a basic commitment to decentralized policymaking - in force of the principle of 
subsidiarity  -  and  the  sense  on  the  part  of  some  that  Europe-wide  standards  for  environmental 
quality are needed (Oates 2002). The key question of the debate remains as to which approach is 
more suitable between moving toward a greater centralization with more responsibility given for 
promoting  environmental  policy  to  the  central  (or  federal)  government  or  encouraging  further 
decentralization and allowing state and local governments a greater role in this kind of policy.1 
Likewise, in the United States, there are uniform national standards for high air quality - decided 
upon by the federal government - but state-specific standards for water quality.2 In Australia, the 
approach adopted in addressing environmental issues - in particular that of water supply - has been 
one of cooperation whereby the policies developed under the “umbrella of cooperation” are monitored 
by the National Competition Council3 and reflect the centralist interpretation of the Constitution in 
the assignment of environmental powers sustained by the High Court of Australia (Petchey 2007). 
Furthermore, the United Nations’ Development Program suggests, for example, facing the risks and 
costs of climate change by assigning to national government the role of setting general standards of 
environmental protection in order to reduce air pollution.  
                                                 
1 The debate over environmental federalism has been intensified recently not only in the United States but also 
in the European Union where the main question concerns the controversy over the independent role of the 
member countries in environmental policymaking and more centralized measures that “harmonize” policies in 
Europe (Schwab 2006).    
2 Cf. Environmental Protection Agency: Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act. 
3 It is a national body with the power (effectively used) to levy financial penalties for non-compliance.   6 
However, it also recognizes that local governments have a significant role to play in order to face 
the adaptation and mitigation costs of climate change or, in general, to decide on how to recover 
environmental quality. A case in point is Brazil, where the conservation of its huge endowment of 
natural resources is not only a domestic issue, even though the responsibility for the preservation of 
the Amazonian forests falls mainly on state and local governments (Cavalcanti 2007). Recent trends 
toward  a  greater  decentralization  of  environmental  policy  have  also  occurred  in  Canada  where, 
although some coordination would be necessary, this would result in significant costs which would 
slow  down  the  political-making  process  (Valiante  2007).  In  particular,  the  implementation  of 
environmental policies occurs primarily through traditional regulatory instruments at the provincial 
level.4 
In  general,  the  complexity  of  ecological  systems  implies  that  decisions  concerning  a  specific 
natural resource generally affect more than one ecological component, although the impact is often 
slow and difficult to predict. Environmental policymaking, in turn, does not emanate from a single 
unitary authority, but is rather the outcome of a multi-layered structure mainly designed by history 
to deal with the large number of different and sometimes conflicting demands that citizens place on 
their governments (Breton et al. 2007). Several questions posed by the assignment of powers over the 
environment have been considered in environmental federalism literature (Oates and Portney 2001), 
yet largely ignored in conventional environmental economics.  
In this vein, the aim of this paper is basically to shed some light on how multi-level governance 
can plan and implement environmental action which would affect the assignment of powers and the 
design of environmental institutions, while at the same time recognizing the need for policies aimed 
not only at controlling pollution and conserving a few particular species but also protecting the 
integrity of ecological systems and functions at local and regional levels. In detail, we will check 
whether  environmental  protection  activities  are  better  accomplished  within  a  country  -  at  least 
theoretically - through centralized policymaking which implies, in our model, a coordinated solution 
among local representatives, or a decentralized system where local authorities independently finance 
and implement their environmental policy.  
We  consider  environmental  protection  activities  as  “those  where  the  primary  purpose  is  the 
protection of the environment; that is, the avoidance of the negative effects on the environment 
caused by economic activities. The activities are generally classified according to the classification of 
environmental protection activities (CEPA 2000)”, where environmental protection refers “to any 
activity to maintain or restore the quality of environmental media through preventing the emission 
of pollutants or reducing the presence of polluting substances in environmental media”,5 according to 
                                                 
4  Moreover,  the  command-and-control  approach  is  gradually  being  supplemented  by  information-based 
schemes, economic instruments and voluntary initiatives.  
5 It may consist of: (a) changes in characteristics of goods and services; (b) changes in consumption patterns; (c) 
changes in production techniques; (d) treatment or disposal of residuals in separate environmental protection 
facilities; (e) recycling; (f) prevention of degradation of the landscape and ecosystems (United Nations 1997).   7 
the standard definition derived from statistical standards developed by international organizations 
such as IMF, OECD, etc. (United Nation et al. 2005).  
Moreover, we assume that environmental policy is an “active” government activity which has a 
cost. Indeed, a common feature of both scenarios is the presence of positive externalities related to 
the  provision  of  environmental  outcome  across  local  jurisdictions.  In  reference  to  this,  we  treat 
positive externalities in a different way as usual,6 that is as a mechanism contributing to lowering the 
cost of environmental protection activities in each region (production externality). In other words, 
the  unitary  cost  of  environmental  provision  is  assumed  to  negatively  depend  on  the  level  of 
externalities linked to the environmental policy implemented in all regions. In such a way, each 
region - most likely neighboring - is assumed to be able to exploit such externalities in order to 
finance  its  own  environmental  policy  at  a  lower  cost.  This  assumption  is  also  quite  common  in 
practice. Indeed, the level of environmental quality in jurisdiction j depends on environmental quality 
in other regions k. Several examples could be provided: the cost of prevention of landslide risk for 
region j can be reduced if the other (neighboring) regions adopt a policy against this kind of risk; 
likewise, the cost of waste disposal can be reduced if others implement policies for disposal. Thus, it 
makes sense to assume that positive interregional externalities may be the source of beneficial effects, 
involving  reduced  costs  to  guarantee  the  same  environmental  quality,  especially  in  a  setting  of 
decentralized policymaking.   
Given this framework, one thing is clear: an efficient environmental protection outcome will not 
generally  take  the  form  of  uniform  national  standards,  but  is  likely  to  imply  different  levels  of 
environmental quality across jurisdictions. On the basis of this line of reasoning, we can also assume 
that  in  both  cases  -  cooperative  and  non-cooperative  decision-making  processes  -  different 
environmental  policies  can  be  implemented  across  regions.  Indeed,  it  is  rather  unclear  -  from  a 
theoretical point of view - why a government entrusted with providing environmental protection in a 
centralized system cannot differentiate the levels according to the heterogeneous tastes and needs in 
each district. This assumption seems to be unsatisfactory also on the empirical front. Indeed, there 
are many examples of goods provided unequally by a central government in a federal system.7  
The modus operandi of EU directives to the European member states, for example, is not one of 
top-down imposition of uniform standards, but a complex decision making system in which member 
states influence the Union's policy formation in the Council (the official institution where they can 
defend their interests) as well as at many other levels in the policy process (Dalmazzone 2006). 
When mechanisms of this sort are at work, they probably create wide margins for central policies to 
                                                 
6 The standard literature (Gilbert and Picard 1996; Conley and Dix 1999; Dur and Staal 2008) in this field 
models  positive  spillovers  deriving  from  externalities  in  the  consumption  of  public  goods  (consumption 
externalities). 
7 The case of federal highway spending in the United States illustrates this well: a significant fraction of funds 
in the Federal Highway Aid Program are earmarked by legislators for specific projects in their districts. This 
approach of “no policy uniformity” is also adopted by the recent stream of fiscal federalism literature - namely 
the Second Generation Theory (Lockwood 2002, 2006; Besley and Coate 2003) - and it can also be extended to 
the environmental protection issue.   8 
reflect local variations across jurisdictions. The institutional devices by which a governance system 
can  build  up  the  capacity  for  higher  levels  of  government  to  tailor  their  policies  to  suit  local 
heterogeneity  are  a  subject  that  deserves  further  attention.  The  key  point  remains  that  an 
environmental policy which has to prevent the cost of environmental degradation (i.e. to anticipate 
and mitigate the cost of climate change) has to be decided at the local level. Thus, an environmental 
policy that is appropriate in one region is unlikely to be appropriate in other regions. Federal or 
central regulation is rarely sensitive to these differences; on the other hand, it often implies a single 
uniform policy in all regions. Revesz (1996), for example, shows that in the arena of air quality 
management, federal measures in the United States have not been very effective in addressing the 
issue of interstate externalities.  
To  some  extent,  this  approach  should  sound  familiar  to  the  more  general  issue  of  fiscal 
federalism according to which it would make little sense - on the grounds of efficiency - to provide 
the same menu of public services in each community (Tiebout 1956, Oates 1972). In this vein, we 
allow state and local governments to decide how much to spend on education, when refuse has to be 
collected, and so on (Schwab 2006). This logic would lead to the conclusion that state and local 
governments may be in a better position than the federal (or central) government to choose also the 
correct level of environmental quality for their constituencies. Yet, this may conflict with the general 
presumption that uniform standards should be satisfied within the national territory. To solve this 
problem, we assume that a minimum standard level of environmental protection is provided by local 
jurisdictions  when  they  autonomously  implement  environmental  policy  and  also  when  they 
cooperate to design this kind of intervention. 
Allowing each community, region, and state to design and implement its own distinctive blend of 
policies and plans that best promises to support environmental protection (Kraft and Scheberle 1998) 
also implies a system of differentiated taxes that would depend on the location of the source and the 
people affected. Such differentiated tax rates are determined and imposed separately by each local 
authority under decentralization and jointly by all regions under centralization which represents a 
case  of  regional  cooperation.  Other  things  equal,  the  research  question  remains  to  compare -  in 
welfare  terms  -  the  outcome  under  a  cooperative  decision-making  institution  with  that  of  a 
decentralized system that allows each jurisdiction to select its own preferred environmental policy.  
In general, a purely decentralized system would be expected to provide too little in the way of 
research and development environmental activities given that individual state, provincial, or local 
governments would typically ignore the benefits that such activities provide to residents in other 
places. However, we have to recognize that decentralization can provide a valuable dimension in 
policy  innovation  by  offering  the  opportunity  for  experimentation  with  differing  approaches  to 
environmental management (Oates 1999). Moreover, the Dinan et al. study (1999) on the setting of 
uniform  national  standards  for  drinking  water  in  the  United  States  indicates  the  potentially   9 
significant  magnitude  of  welfare  losses  arising  from  this  uniformity.8  Hence,  for  environmental 
matters of strictly local interest (treated as local public goods) a decentralized system of setting 
ambient standards seems to be appropriate. Indeed, the “one size fits all” approach9 can result in large 
welfare losses compared with a system in which individual jurisdictions introduce standards that are 
the best suited to their circumstances (Oates 2002).  
Nevertheless, it may be difficult to reach a general conclusion for these two prevalent categories 
of cases. A better approach might be to determine the particular circumstances that favour one of the 
two  alternatives  over  the  other.  Such  considerations  may  involve  the  extent  of  the  inter-
jurisdictional  positive  spillovers,  the  size  of  local  jurisdictions  and  regional  preferences  for 
environmental protection activity. The issue of size,10 for example, is relevant since it allows a range 
of different public policies under decentralization and centralization. Oates and Schwab (1988) argue 
that  “’small  homogeneous  jurisdictions’”  decentralized  choices  are  likely  to  be  socially  optimal 
because each local government sets environmental standards to equate marginal benefits with the 
incremental costs. Kanbur et al. (1995) take into account the dimension of the country and show that 
small countries will reduce their environmental standards to be able to attract foreign investors. 
More recently, Kunce and Shogren (2005) have highlighted the difficulty of “small” jurisdictions to 
use efficient tax instruments (i.e., a “firm tax”) with the effect of Pigovian remedies to realign the 
overprotection  equilibrium  with  social  efficiency  and  affirm  that  without  these  foremost  optimal 
instruments,  distortions  persist  in  both  fiscal  and  environmental  choices.  More  generally,  the 
efficient levels of concentration of air pollutants in Los Angeles are surely very different from those 
in Buffalo; likewise for Paris and Venice (Oates 2002). 
From this point of view, the role of size in strategic tax and spending design may be important. 
Disparity in size may be, for example, a source of inefficiency itself, exacerbating the loss that each 
region suffers as a consequence of non-cooperative behaviour. Increasing differences in population 
size across regions would lead towards the cooperative solution. Intuitively, a high variability in size 
leads to a high variability in costs to provide the public good. Thus, to avoid disparities in costs 
among regions, the cooperative system seems to be the best. This result is mainly due to the cross 
subsidization  effect,  which  implies  an  implicit  transfer  across  different  regions  in  line  with  the 
Boadway and Hobson’s model (1993). Yet with the introduction of spillovers, it emerges that from a 
positive viewpoint coordination of environmental protection should not be necessarily pursued by all 
                                                 
8 This is a case where the costs of treatment per capita vary so dramatically across jurisdictions that uniform 
standards come at a very high welfare cost compared with the efficient pattern of local treatment. 
9 In general, economic institutions need to be designed and shaped, on the basis of general principles, to suit 
the local context and to embody local knowledge. Indeed, the effectiveness of strictly local services (i.e. water 
supply, waste disposal, local transport) as well as of more general services (such as education, health care, law 
and order) strongly depends on their being adapted to places. Institutions providing these services should then 
be tailored to specific local contexts (Barca 2009). 
10 In reference to the meaning of size, it can be measured in terms of land or population (King 1984), and also 
considering the public budget of government. We define size in terms of population, as in most of the literature 
of fiscal federalism (Buchanan 1965; Oates 1972).   10 
regions, but it depends on their relative size. In particular, the net gain between the potential benefit 
of free-riding behaviour and the effect of internalizing spillovers among different jurisdictions should 
be taken into account, as it is likely to differ for large and small local units. Indeed, non-cooperation 
becomes more attractive at high spillover levels for small regions (and those with high preferences 
for environmental policy), which have a larger incentive to free-ride on each other’s policies and 
production  costs.  At  the  same  time,  large  regions  (and  those  with  low  preferences  for  the 
environmental public good) gain more through coordination instead of remaining autonomous and 
acting as a free-rider, ceteris paribus.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the general framework of 
the model. Section 3 derives conditions under which a cooperative or a non-cooperative institutional 
system  is  the  most  appropriate  and  efficient  to  implement  environmental  protection  activities. 
Finally, Section 4 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. The model: hypotheses and assumptions 
 
2.1 The welfare function 
 
We propose a multiple-regions model where the economy is divided into   geographically distinct 
regions indexed by  , each populated by a different number of individuals ( ), 
who are heterogeneous and immobile.11 The total population of the country is represented by   
(with   ). The utility function of the representative inhabitant - the median-voter - in 
region   is: 
 
(1)                                                                  
 
where    is  the  private  good  and    is  the  “local  public  good”,  which  represents  the  set  of 
environmental protection activities provided by each local authority.12 In other words, the kind of 
public action subject to decision concerns environmental protection aimed at reducing environmental 
                                                 
11  We  ignore  issues  of  mobility  in  this  analysis.  While  such  considerations  are  obviously  important, 
incorporating them is sufficiently difficult that they are best left for a separate paper. 
12 The level of   is greater than 0 ( ) as we assume there exists a minimum level of environmental 
output provided by each government. This can be intended as a uniform environmental protection standard 
with  “merit  good”  content.  The  mechanism  works  when  regions  autonomously  implement  environmental 
policy and when they also cooperate to design this kind of intervention.   11 
damage  in  order  to  increase  individual  welfare.  The  parameter    (satisfying  )  is  the 
environmental  protection  preference  of  the  median-voter  in  jurisdiction  .  It  indicates,  to  some 
extent, the “green preference” of each local community.  
In a non-cooperative regional system, each policy maker maximizes the local welfare function 
corresponding  to  the  median-voter’s  utility13  in  order  to  implement  the  socially-accepted 
environmental policy under a decentralized system: 
 
(2)                                                                  
 
Likewise, under a cooperative regional system - centralization - a government representing all 
districts decides different levels of environmental protection in each region, thus maximizing the 
aggregate welfare function given by the sum of the median-voter’s utilities of each community:   
 
(2.a)                                                            
 
 
2.2 The budget constraint and cost function 
 
Under an uncoordinated system, the budget constraint of the representative individual is as follows:  
 
 (3)                                                                                                                                       
 
where the private good is the numerary, while   represents the individual contribution paid by each 
citizen to finance environmental provision. Hence, environmental policy is financed by a uniform 
head tax on local residents represented by  .   
Under a coordinated system, a government representing all districts decides different levels of 
environmental protection in each region and sets a uniform head tax on all citizens ( ). Thus, the 
representative individual budget constraint is as follows: 
 
(3.a)                                                                                                                                       
 
                                                 
13 As individual preferences are single-peaked and unidimensional, the median-voter’s theorem holds and it can be 
applied to determine the level of environmental policy.   12 
The unitary cost of environmental policy ( ) is assumed to be different across regions. It is a 
function of the amount of environmental outcomes provided in all regions. It means that the cost in a 
region depends on the environmental policy adopted in the others (i.e., the cost of waste disposal can 
be reduced if other regions implement similar policies; the cost of preventing landslides in region j 
can be reduced if others adopt analogous policies). We assume that it negatively depends on the 
average environmental protection:  
 
(4)                                                                                                              
 
The degree of inter-jurisdictional spillovers ( ) negatively affects the cost of environmental 
policy. For simplicity, such externalities are supposed to be symmetric and equal for all the regions.14 
Indeed, the parameter   is a measure of the average spillover effects deriving from the overall 
environmental  policy.  Since  the  total  size  of  the  economy  is  fixed  ( ),  the  overall  effect  of 
externalities - which is over the whole national territory - on costs for environmental protection 
should not depend on the number of regions in which the territory is divided. Equation (4) captures 
this aspect, where   is the same fixed cost. We consider that the cost associated with environmental 
policy mainly concerns enforcement procedures and precautionary actions. 
As  explained  before,  we  treat  external  spillovers  as  a  mechanism  allowing  the  reduction  in 
production  costs  of  environmental  policy  in  each  -  mostly  neighboring  -  local  jurisdiction 
(externality production). The intuition is the following. When positive externalities are large (  is 
high), the production cost is lower as each policy maker can exploit these beneficial effects by paying 
less for providing environmental protection to the local community; on the contrary, when positive 
externalities are small (  is low), the opposite situation takes place.  
In order to finance environmental policy in jurisdiction , local government collects taxes on its 
residents. In detail, the sum of all contributions collected within each region ( ), in the case of 
the  non-cooperative  solution  (decentralization),  is  assumed  to  be  equal  to  the  total  cost  of 
environmental protection in that region ( ): 
 
(5)                                                                            
                                                 
                                                 
14 This means that externalities are two-way: the policy adopted in region j reduces the cost of environmental 
policy in region k, and vice versa, in a symmetric way. This assumption allows simplifying algebra without 
changing the qualitative results.   13 
The idea is that benevolent politicians adopt a “full recovery costs” strategy, setting taxation levels 
equal to the cost of providing environmental policy, without any additional gains for themselves. 
Something  different  occurs  in  the  case  of  the  cooperative  solution  (centralization).    Indeed, 
politicians of all regions are assumed to cooperate and choose not to differentiate inhabitants in 
terms of taxation ( ). Hence, they set a unique tax in order to cover environmental production 
costs in all jurisdictions:  
 
(5.a)                                                                                                      
 
In short, equations (5) and (5.a) represent the government budget constraint, respectively under a 
non-cooperative and cooperative system. In both cases, in order to be re-elected, the policy maker 
should provide the amount of environmental protection required by the median-voter in each region, 
whatever the level of taxation.15 Thus:   under an uncoordinated system;   under a 
coordinated system.            
 
2.3 Tax setting  
 
With a non-cooperative solution, each region covers its costs to provide environmental policy with 
its own tax revenue. By substituting environmental protection preferred by the median-voter into 
equation (5), we derive the level of taxation set by the local policy maker: 
 
(6)                                                           
 
The tax solution negatively depends on the degree of externalities ( ).  
With  a  cooperative  solution,  all  regions  together  cover  the  cost  of  providing  environmental 
protection with the sum of their tax revenues. In this case, local jurisdictions could themselves cross 
subsidize environmental protection. Substituting the median-voter’s environmental quality level into 
equation (5.a), results in the following:  
 
                                                 
15 For further details on this assumption, see Fiorillo and Sacchi (2011).   14 
(6.a)                                                           
 
 
3. Environmental protection under different institutional settings 
 
3.1 The choice of regions 
 
The median-voter’s utility increases with the level of environmental protection provided by local 
governments. In this section, we make considerations as to which regions vote for cooperation and 
which do not. Thus, in each region the median-voter would vote for the institutional system which 
guarantees the highest amount of environmental policy; the actual institutional system depends on 
how the vote of regions are weighted. In reference to this, we compare environmental outcomes 
given tax solutions obtained in the previous steps, respectively in equations (6) and (6.a):  
 
 
(7)                                                           
 
(7.a)                                                           
 
Equations  (7)  and  (7.a)  describe  environmental  policy  implemented  respectively  under  a  non-
cooperative and a cooperative institutional setting, where “policy uniformity” is never assumed and a 
different amount of environmental protection in each local community is allowed also when regions 
cooperate.   15 
Let us define    and   as the arithmetic and geometric mean of the 
regional  preferences  of  the  median-voters,  respectively.  Moreover,  assuming    as  the 
average population size of regions, we finally introduce a new parameter:   which 
represents  the  gross  mark-up  on  variable  costs  in  region    ( )  necessary  to  finance 
environmental protection equal to the average spending on this kind of policy in all regions ( ). 
The idea is that a high average spending and high fixed costs would imply a higher mark-up while, 
with a higher expenditure in region   ( ) - determined by high values of   and   - a lower 
mark-up would be required. Starting from  , two indexes can be considered:   and 
, which are the harmonic and geometric mean of the gross mark-up, respectively.  
 
After some algebra, equations (7) and (7.a) can be finally rewritten as follows: 
 
(8)                                                           
 
(8.a)                                                           
 
Both environmental provisions directly depend on summary measures of regional preferences (  
for   and   for  , respectively) and inversely on those of the gross mark-up ( for   and 
 for  , respectively).  
In  this  vein,  we  can  introduce  two  indicators  of  heterogeneity  in  order  to  easily  compare 
environmental  policy  under  coordinated  and  non-coordinated  institutional  systems.  The  former   16 
concerns preference heterogeneity,  , which increases with the variance in preferences; the latter 
describes the heterogeneity in mark-up,  ,  which increases with the variance in preferences and 
variability  of  local  size  ( ).  Hence,  the  choice  between  the  cooperative  and  non-cooperative 
solution  is  mainly  determined  by  these  two  indexes  of  heterogeneity,  given  different  values  of 
externalities ( ). 
Considering the logarithmic form of equations (8) and (8.a), region   would prefer the non-
cooperative  institutional  setting,  which  provides  a  larger  level  of  environmental  protection 
( ), if the following is verified: 
 
(9)                                                                                              
 
where   and  .   
Starting from the right hand term, we have the following:  
 
Proposition  1:  Increasing  differences  in  population  size  across  regions  would  lead  towards  the 
cooperative solution; while, with increasing heterogeneity of preferences, regions prefer  the non-cooperative 
system. 
 
Proof: The proof is straightforward.  ! 
 
Equation  (9)  is  likely  to  be  false  when  the  variability  of  regional  size  grows,  contributing  to 
increasing the   indicator, ceteris paribus. Following this rule, a coordinated institutional system is 
preferred when regions are quite different in size. Intuitively, high variability in size leads to high 
variability in costs to implement environmental policy, whereby smaller jurisdictions suffer higher 
costs  and  mark-up.  Hence,  to  avoid  disparities  in  costs  among  regions,  the  cooperative  system 
appears to be the best solution. In this case, cross subsidization occurs from larger to smaller regions 
and its effect is obviously different considering local population size. 
Concerning preferences heterogeneity, it is also easy to show that an increasing variability in 
preferences has two effects: a direct one implying an increase of the  index, which contributes to 
verifying equation (9); an indirect one concerning the increase of mark-up heterogeneity ( ), 
which contributes to a non-verification of equation (9). According to the traditional theory of fiscal   17 
federalism (Tiebout 1956; Buchanan 1965; Oates 1972), we can basically assume that the direct effect 
prevails  over  the  indirect  one,  therefore  establishing  that  a  higher  degree  of  preferences 
heterogeneity is likely to favour a non-cooperative system (such as decentralization). 
Observing the left hand side, we have the following: 
 
Proposition 2: The cooperative solution is preferred by smaller regions and those with higher preferences 
for environmental protection. 
 
Proof: Equation (9) is likely to be false - citizens of region   do not prefer the non-cooperative 
institutional setting - when regions are quite small. This means that their relative mark-up ( ) 
is high. Indeed, smaller regions have to pay higher per capita costs, so they prefer a coordinated 
policymaking  where  implicit  transfers  across  regions  (from  larger  to  smaller)  can  take  place. 
Likewise, when the median-voter’s environmental preference is higher than the average (  is 
high), the conventional two effects occur. As explained before, we assume that the direct effect is 
stronger than the indirect one, hence favouring cooperation.  Indeed, regions with higher preferences 
for environmental protection are likely to be cross subsidized by those with lower preferences.  ! 
 
Moreover, the following emerges from the examination of externalities: 
 
Proposition 3: When regions have low preferences for environmental protection and they are large, their 
mark-up is lower than the average and we have:  . Then:  
 
a)  Citizens  always  prefer  the  non-cooperative  solution  when  the  right  hand  term  is  positive 
( ). 
b)  When the right hand term is negative ( ), there exists a threshold for externalities: 
below the threshold, regions would not prefer cooperation and beyond the threshold they would prefer, 
cooperation. 
 
Proof: see the Appendix.  ! 
 
With large jurisdictions and those with low preferences for environmental policy, the standard result 
may emerge that the non-cooperative solution would be better in the case of high heterogeneity of 
preferences within the whole territory and with low externalities. For these regions, the effect of   18 
cross  subsidization  is  negative  as  they  have  to  pay  implicit  transfers  to  those  with  higher 
environmental preferences under a cooperative institutional setting. On the other hand, under a non-
coordinated system, large municipalities can autonomously finance their environmental policy, even 
without  any  external  spillovers  to  exploit.  When  spillovers  increase,  those  regions  start  to 
internalize externalities instead of remaining autonomous as gains from internalization outweigh the 
advantages  of  free-riding  This  is  mostly  true  when  disparities  in  size  are  very  high 
( ). 
 
Proposition 4: When regions have high preferences for environmental protection and they are small, their 
mark-up is higher than the average and we have: ( ). Consequently:  
a)  Citizens  always  prefer  the  cooperative  solution  when  the  right  hand  term  is  negative 
( ). 
b)  When the right hand term is positive ( ), there exists a threshold for externalities: 
below  the  threshold,  regions  would  prefer  cooperation  and  beyond  that  threshold,  they  would  not 
cooperate. 
 
Proof: see the Appendix.  ! 
 
To summarize, the advantages of free-riding may be asymmetric for regions differing in preferences 
and  size  -  as  in  Kanbur  and  Keen’s  (1993)  -  and  can  also  offset  the  benefits  of  internalizing 
externalities.  The  intuition  behind  this  result  is  as  follows.  Small  regions  and  those  with  high 
preferences for environmental protection would prefer the cooperative solution as they try to charge 
other regions for some production cost. Generally speaking, this may reflect why such municipalities 
would prefer monetary transfers from the State, rather than autonomously deciding their policy. 
When positive spillovers increase, these regions may start to find a non-coordinated system more 
suitable  as  they  can  exploit,  as  a  free-rider,  beneficial  externalities  deriving  from  environmental 
protection provided by other regions. Moreover, the free-riding behaviour can be convenient when 
preferences heterogeneity is high ( ).  
In short, we may conclude that regional preferences, the extent of spillovers and the size of local 
jurisdictions  determine  whether  a  coordinated  or  non-coordinated  institutional  setting  for 
environmental policy is more suitable. In addition, our propositions suggest that cases of under-
provision of environmental protection may occur. Indeed, when the emerging institutional setting is 
that not preferred by some regions (i.e., small or large, those with low preferences or with high 
preferences), this implies, by definition, that environmental policy is under-provided. In detail, this 
kind  of  under-protection  is  not  due  to  the  fact  that  we  do  not  consider  positive  inter-regional   19 
spillovers,  as  in  the  traditional  literature;  nor  to  inter-jurisdictional  competition  by  which  local 
governments lowered their environmental standards in order to hold down the costs of compliance 
for existing and prospective firms. This is the case where the resulting dynamic instability - in the 
absence of countervailing forces - could set a competitive “race to the bottom” strategy (Oates and 
Schwab 1988; Wellish 1995; Wilson 1996; Oates and Portney 2001; Oates 2002; Kunce and Shogren, 
2005) leading to inefficiently low levels of environmental protection.  
In our case, under-provision of environmental quality is mainly due to the fact that some regions 
are forced after voting to have an institutional setting they do not prefer. Indeed, it depends on the 
fact that the effects and convenience of cross subsidization may be different considering local size. In 
particular, smaller regions may not have enough resources to autonomously finance environmental 
policy  for  their  community;  the  opposite  situation  could  take  place  for  larger  ones.  Hence,  a 
cooperative institutional system can generally bring benefits for someone who needs financial help, 
but it may also imply a waste of resources for someone else who should pay more than in the case of 
a non-cooperative setting.  
Even when introducing the impact of externalities, the key insight of our findings is the different 
size  of  regions,  which  may  determine  an  asymmetry  among  regions’  responses  to  the  best 
institutional  solution  necessary  to  implement  environmental  policy.  Hence,  from  a  positive 
viewpoint, a non-coordinated system should not be voted only without externalities, but also with 
high  spillovers.  Actually,  this  system  would  be  voted  by  small  regions  and  those  with  higher 
preferences  for  environmental  protection,  where  the  free-riding  gains  outweigh  the  benefits  of 
internalizing spillovers. 
 
3.2 The level of overall environmental protection 
 
Finally, we analyze under which conditions the highest level of environmental protection could be 
obtained. In other words, we propose a normative approach suggesting which institutional setting 
should  be  adopted  in  order  to  provide  and  guarantee  -  in  aggregate  terms  –  a  more  pervasive 
environmental policy within the national territory. In this vein, we compare the total outcomes for 
environmental policy obtained in the previous part of the analysis summing up16 the output levels of 
all regions. The overall environmental protection in a non-coordinated system is: 
 
 (10)                                                
 
                                                 
16 We can obtain the same result defining the overall protection as the product of the output level of all 
regions.   20 
Under a coordinated system it is: 
 
(10.a)                                                
 
Comparing equations (10) and (10.a), we have the following: 
 
Proposition 5: The level of overall environmental protection is higher with a non-cooperative regime if 
, thus if  .  
 
Proof: see the Appendix.  ! 
 
Thus,  in  order  to  provide  the  highest  level  of  environmental  protection,  a  State  -  where 
heterogeneity in preferences is higher than heterogeneity in size - should adopt a non-cooperative 
institutional setting. On the contrary, disparity in size higher than variability in preferences would 
require a cooperative institutional setting which could guarantee a greater environmental output to 
all citizens. 
Actually, since within the national territory cultural values are likely to be quite homogenous, 
heterogeneity in regional preferences for a public good such as environmental protection can be 
assumed to be lower than heterogeneity in regional size. This means that a coordinated system 
would  be  better  in  order  to  provide  a  higher  level  of  environmental  policy.  On  the  other  hand, 
cultural  differences  among  national  communities  are  likely  to  be  wider.  Thus,  preferences 
heterogeneity across countries suggests that coordination in environmental policymaking could not 
be the optimal solution. 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
In  conventional  environmental  economics  (as  in  the  welfare  economics  literature  from  which  it 
descends),  governments  are  depicted  as  carrying  the  responsibility  for  much  of  the  desired 
environmental protection. That literature tends to ignore that fact that environmental policymaking 
does not originate from a single unitary authority but is the outcome of a multi-layered structure 
designed to deal with the large number of differing and conflicting demands that citizens place on 
their governments. In this perspective, decentralization seems a way of dealing effectively with a   21 
large number of objectives, increasing flexibility in policymaking and permitting the use of a broader 
range of policy instruments (Dalmazzone 2006).  
However, this solution may not be the best for all regions, especially given their size. Indeed, we 
have demonstrated that the relative performance of “centralized” and “decentralized” provisions - 
corresponding,  respectively,  to  cooperative  and  non-cooperative  solutions  in  our  model  -  of 
environmental protection activity depends upon the extent of spillovers, differences in tastes for 
environmental policy and disparities in regional size. In other words, the outcome of environmental 
policy  can  be  tailored  to  the  preferences  of  citizens,  the  costs  of  production  and  other  local 
conditions; this would allow the attainment of a higher social welfare compared to the provision of a 
uniform standard of environmental protection across all jurisdictions.  
In the case of environmental governance, in several countries, a tendency has been observed for 
the  policies  of  the  central  government  not  to  be  imposed  by  a  command  system  but  to  be 
implemented  unevenly  and  flexibly  through  a  process  of  negotiation  (Breton  and  Salmon  2007). 
Without assuming policy uniformity also under a cooperative legislature (as in Oates and Schwab 
1996; Oates 2002; Oates and Portney 2001; Lockwood 2002; Besley and Coate 2003), we can identify 
the following factors which interact to determine the choice between the two solutions: a) the free-
riding gains exploiting positive externalities; b) the gains of internalizing externalities; c) the degree 
of preferences heterogeneity; d) cross subsidization across different regions, where the net benefit of 
each item is basically different for large and small communities.  
Indeed, key features of the paper have been the focus on the size of local jurisdictions - which can 
be  relevant  for  the  scale  effect  in  the  financing  mechanism  of  non-rival  public  goods,  such  as 
environmental policy - and modelling interregional externalities as a mechanism contributing to 
lowering the production cost of environmental provision in each region. This means that positive 
spillover  effects  do  not  derive  from  externalities  in  the  consumption  of  environmental  policy 
(consumption  externalities)  rather  from  cost-reducing  spillover  effects  in  the  implementation  of 
environmental policy in different jurisdictions (production externalities).  
Given this general framework, the main results of the paper are that increasing differences in 
population  size  across  regions  would  basically  lead  towards  the  cooperative  solution;  while, 
increasing heterogeneity in preferences mostly to the non-cooperative scenario. To some extent, this 
finding is quite consistent with the traditional theory of fiscal federalism according to which “the 
welfare gain from the decentralized provision of particular local public good becomes greater as the 
diversity of individual demands within the country as a whole increases” (Oates 1972). Indeed, a 
central  point  in  favour  of  decentralized  standard  setting  to  maximize  social  welfare  is  that 
heterogeneous preferences across jurisdictions  over  environmental and health standards must be 
respected. 
Yet, considering spillover effects and the different size of local jurisdictions allow for a better 
qualification of these results. In addition, environmental economists have substantially ignored inter-  22 
jurisdictional externalities as a motive behind the assignment of powers over the environment.17 In 
reference to this, our findings suggest that the familiar presumption that a coordinated institutional 
setting is preferable only with higher spillovers is not confirmed since it can be chosen also for a low 
degree of spillovers. For small regions and those with higher preferences for environmental quality, 
for example, the free-riding gains outweigh the benefits of internalizing spillovers, favouring non-
cooperation, when beneficial spillovers increase. At the same time, large jurisdictions and those with 
low preferences for environmental protection policy would prefer non-cooperation only without any 
external spillovers to exploit; while, when spillovers increase, they start to internalize spillovers  
through cooperation mechanisms hence gaining more from internalization than from free-riding.  
Finally, the model could be also developed in order to consider different kinds of externalities, 
such as technological ones, allowing no symmetric effects of spillover as we have already assumed in 
this paper. Moreover, an empirical investigation on the behaviour of regions with different sizes in 























                                                 
17 One reason may be that many inter-jurisdictional externalities can be dealt with coordination – a theme 
which has received attention in the literature on decentralization for example by Breton and Scott (1978) and 




Proof of Proposition 3 
  
 
(9)                                                                                                  
 
!  The proof of case a) is straightforward. 
!  In the case b), the left hand side is increasing in   and:  
 
         and                
 
This proves the case b).  
 
Hence, Proposition 3 is proved.  ! 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
  
 
 (9)                                                                                                                                                               
 
!  The proof of case a) is straightforward. 
!  In the case b), the left hand side is decreasing in   and:  
 
           and               
 
This proves the case b).  
 
Hence, Proposition 4 is proved.  !   24 
Proof of Proposition 5 
 
Substituting    in  equation  (10)  and    in  equation  (10.a),  we  that  that 
 if  . 
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